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CHAPTER 5 
Corpora tions 
BERTRAM H. LOEWENBERG 
§5.1. Foreign corporations: Maintenance of sales office not "doing 
business" for purposes of qualification. The highly publicized N orth-
western-Stockham decision of the United States Supreme Court,l con-
firming the power of the states to tax the income of foreign corpora-
tions engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, has focused new 
attention on the problems faced by foreign corporations that do busi-
ness beyond the borders of their domiciliary states. Congress reacted 
to the Northwestern-Stockham decision by hastily enacting legislation 
that curbed the power of the states· to tax when the only domestic 
activity of the foreign corporation consisted of the solicitation of 
orders for the sale of merchandise to be shipped from outside the 
state.2 The statute, obviously intended as a stopgap,3 provides only 
limited relief, since it does not purport to exempt a foreign corpora-
tion that goes beyond mere solicitation and, for example, maintains 
an office or stores merchandise in the taxing jurisdiction. 
Aside from its narrow scope, the federal statute deals exclusively 
with the power to tax. The corporation'S extraterritorial activities 
may also subject it to service of process or an obligation to register 
or "qualify" in one or more of the jurisdictions in which these activi-
ties occur. The foreign corporation in determining its responsibilities 
in these areas must rely upon the statutes and decisions of the states 
in question. 
In Remington Arms Co. v. Lechmere Tire & Sales CO.,4 the plaintiff, 
a Delaware corporation, brought a suit in equity under the state Fair 
Trade Law5 to enjoin the defendant, a Massachusetts corporation, 
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§5.1. 1 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and Williams v. 
Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450, 79 Sup. Ct. 357, 3 L. Ed. 2d 421 
(1959). 
2 Pub. L. 86·272, 73 Stat. 555, approved September 14, 1959. 
3 The statute (§§201 and 302) directed Congressional committees to study the 
matter of state taxation of income derived from intentate commerce and to 
recommend proposed legislation on or before July I, 1962. 
41959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7I 7, 158 N.E.2d 134. 
5 G.L., c. 93, §§14A·14D. 
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from selling the plaintiff's trade-marked rifles and ammunition at 
prices below the established minimum retail prices. Lechmere con-
ceded the violation but asserted that Remington's failure to comply 
with the provisions of G.L., c. 181, deprived it of the right to maintain 
the suit.6 
Remington's products were manufactured in factories located out-
side of Massachusetts. but it maintained a leased office in Boston serv-
iced by a district manager and a secretary. The former's principal 
activities consisted of the solicitation of orders from wholesalers 
throughout New England. occasional calls on retailers. and checking 
the maintenance of fair trade prices. All orders were accepted at 
Remington's home office and were shipped f.o.b. the factory. Aside 
from office furniture. a few sample guns. some advertising material and 
a small bank account. the plaintiff had no property in Massachusetts. 
Remington contended that as a foreign corporation engaged solely 
in interstate commerce it was not obliged to comply with the qualifica-
tion requirements of Chapter 181. The case was reported without 
decision and the Supreme Judicial Court sustained Remington's posi-
tion. The Court relied upon earlier precedents exempting companies 
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. and pointed out that the 
maintenance of the office and bank account. the employment of sales-
men and a stenographer, and the presence of samples had been held 
to be merely incidental to the conduct of interstate commerce.7 
What gave the Court pause was the rather elaborate machinery set 
up by Remington to enforce its fair trade policy. Although notices 
to alleged violators were mailed from the home office. the district 
manager often followed these up by personal visits. and professional 
shoppers were used as the basis for filing fair trade visits. The Court 
concluded. however. that these activities designed to protect the plain-
tiff's good will were part of its interstate business. 
Although the Court did not cite Northwestern-Stockham, it con-
ceded that recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court would 
justify broadening the scope of Chapter 181.8 Thus under North-
western-Stockham the Commonwealth undoubtedly has the legislative 
power to levy a fairly apportioned tax on the income derived from 
Remington's Massachusetts business. Yet the Supreme Judicial Court 
8 Chapter 181 requires certain foreign corporations, principally those which "do 
business" or "have a usual place of business" in the Commonwealth, to appoint 
the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation as their attorney for the service 
of process (§3), and to file with him copies of their charters and other information 
(§5), together with annual certificates of condition (§12). Failure to comply with 
these sections subjects corporate officers to certain penalties, including personal 
liability for debts and contracts entered into within the Commonwealth (§5). The 
corporation itself is barred from maintaining any action in the state courts (§5). 
7 Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. Commonwealth, 218 Mass. 558, 
106 N.E. 310 (1914). 
8 Although no specific cases were cited, the Court undoubtedly had in mind, 
in addition to Northwestern-Stockham, such decisions as International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), and Wisconsin v. 
]. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 61 Sup. Ct. 246, 85 L. Ed. 267 (1940). 
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had in earlier cases exempted from the Massachusetts corporation ex-
cise foreign corporations whose activities were comparable to those 
carried on by Remington.1I These tax decisions in the light of the 
present case confirm the general rule that the obligation of a foreign 
corporation to qualify and its liability to local income taxation are 
normally determined by the same criteria.10 The Court in Remington, 
however, was obviously reluctant in the absence of legislative action 
to broaden the scope of Chapter 181 merely because the United 
States Supreme Court had ruled that the states had broader powers to 
regulate foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce than 
Massachusetts had seen fit to exercise. 
In addition to its potential qualification and tax obligations, the 
foreign corporation that ventures abroad may find itself subject to 
service of process in a nondomiciliary jurisdiction, even when its local 
activity is isolated or insubstantial. The plaintiff in Remington, for 
example, conceded that it was probably subject to service of process 
in Massachusetts,ll and recent decisions confirm the validity of this 
concession. 12 The applicable statute subjects the foreign corporation 
to service of process not only when it has a usual place of business in 
the Commonwealth, but even when it "is engaged in or soliciting 
business in the commonwealth, permanently or temporarily." 13 In 
Thurman v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.14 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court held, on constitutional grounds, that the mere soliciting 
of business was insufficient to confer jurisdiction despite the literal 
wording of the statute. More recent cases,l1S however, while recog-
nizing that something more than mere solicitation is required, have 
impliedly criticized the constitutional fears expressed in Thurman. 
Accordingly, a foreign corporation that accompanies its solicitation 
of business in Massachusetts with any type of promotional work, in-
vestigation of complaints, servicing, or the like will probably be sub-
ject to service of process.16 
§5.2. The "corporate opportunity" doctrine: Director's liability to 
corporation for commission paid him. That a director owes a fidu-
II See the cases cited in note 7 supra. 
10 Compare Attorney General v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 188 Mass. 2119, 74 
N.E. 467 (1905). with Garvey v. Wesson, 258 Mass. 48. 154 N.E. 516 (1926). 
11 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 717, 722. 158 N.E.2d 134. 138. 
12 Jet Manufacturing Co. v. Sanford Ink Co .• 330 Mass. 1711. 112 N.E.2d 252 
(1953); Wyshak v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co."328 Mass. 219. lOll N.E.2d 230 
(1952). 
18 G.L .• c. 223. §38. 
14 254 Mass. 569. 151 N.E. 611 (1926). 
111 See the cases cited in note 12 supra. 
18 See the cases cited in note 12 supra; Schmikler v. Petersime Incubator Co .• 77 
F. Supp. II (D. Mass. 1948). However, although the "solicitation plus" activities 
have been held to give Massachusetts jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. 
service upon the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation will not be effective 
under G.L., c. 181. §3A. unless the cause of action arose out of business done within 
the Commonwealth. Nichols v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 864 (D. Mass. 
1952). 
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ciary duty to his corporation is a well-recognized principle, but its 
application often raises subtle questions of business ethics. When the 
so-called "corporate opportunity" doctrine is involved, the issue for 
the court's determination is whether the director has profited person-
ally from a transaction whose benefits should have flowed to the cor-
poration.1 
Weismann v. Snyder2 was such a case. The corporation's business 
was acting as broker for food manufacturers and canners in the sale 
of their products to wholesale grocers and jobbers. The defendant 
Snyder, who was president, manager and owner of half the corporate 
stock, learned while making a business call that one of the corpora-
tion's customers, Pappas Company, a wholesale grocer, desired to sell 
its Springfield branch. Through Snyder's efforts a sale of Pappas's 
Springfield business to another customer of the corporation was ar-
ranged, and Snyder was paid a commission for his services. The trial 
court in dismissing a suit brought by the corporation's trustee in 
liquidation ruled as a matter of law that there had been no wrongful 
pre-emption by Snyder of a corporate opportunity. 
On appeal, the evidence was reported and the Supreme Judicial 
Court, holding that the trial judge had failed to make ultimate con-
clusions of fact decisive to the case, remanded it so that such ultimate 
findings could be made. The Court clearly intimated that certain ad-
ditional facts could be found on the evidence that would lead to a 
different result. Among these were findings that the corporate charter 
powers were broad enough to include sales activity such as that in-
volved in the Pappas sale; that Snyder had used corporate time and 
perhaps minor corporate expense money in making the sale; and that 
he had not made full disclosure of the progress and details of the 
Pappas transaction to the other stockholder.3 
In thus impliedly holding that the director had seized a corporate 
opportunity, the Court followed a line of decisions in which the fidu-
ciary has been ordered to make restitution to the corporation.4 The 
guiding principle was defined, in Durfee v. Durfee &- Canning, Inc.,5 
as the unfairness of a director's taking advantage of an opportunity 
for personal profit "when the interests of the corporation justly call 
for protection," a doctrine that "calls for the application of ethical 
standards of what is fair and equitable." 6 In recent years the only 
Massachusetts case in which the fiduciary has prevailed was Black v. 
§5.2. 1 Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948); 
Ballantine. Corporations §79 (rev. ed. 1946). 
2338 Mass. 502. 156 N.E.2d 21 (1959). 
3 338 Mass. at 505·506. 156 N .E.2d at 23. 
4 Production Machine Co. v. Howe. 327 Mass. 372. 99 N.E.2d 32 (1951); Durfee 
v. Durfee & Canning. Inc .• 323 Mass. 187. 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948); Essex Trust Co. v. 
Enwright. 214 Mass. 507. 102 N.E. 441 (1913). Cf. Lincoln Stores. Inc. v. Grant. 
309 Mass. 417.34 N.E.2d 704 (1941). 
5323 Mass. 187. 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948). 
6323 Mass. at 199. 80 N.E.2d at 529. 
-----------------y' 
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Parker Manufacturing CO.,7 in which the principal corporate officer 
had invested substantial amounts of his own capital in ventures which 
were at most ancillary to the business of the corporation. After these 
ventures proved to be profitable, their acquisition was challenged by 
a minority stockholder under the corporate opportunity doctrine. 
Relief was denied principally upon the ground that the defendant had 
apparently fully disclosed his acquisitions and, in risking his own 
money rather than the corporation's, had acted in good faith and had 
erred, if at all, only in judgment.8 
The clear implication in the Weismann case that Snyder had over-
reached, together with the general body of Massachusetts decisions 
in this field unfavorable to the fiduciary,9 should deter corporate 
officers from embarking upon ventures that bear any relationship to 
the corporation's business. If the fiduciary, however, in advance makes 
full disclosure of the opportunity to the board of directors, normally 
he will be protected if he thereafter proceeds on his own with the 
know ledge of the board. 
§5.3. Stockholder status recognized despite nonobservance of cor-
porate formalities. Counsel acting for closely held corporations fre-
quently omit the observance of certain formalities, typically with 
respect to the issuance of shares and the holding of corporate meetings. 
These loose practices may be due in part to a feeling of self-conscious-
ness, an awareness that the small businessman acting in the corporate 
form often becomes impatient with the usual corporate paraphernalia 
of waivers of notice, formal minutes of meetings held most informally, 
proxies, and the like. In most instances the departures from good 
corporate practice are harmless. Occasionally, however, the victim of 
these lapses may have to establish his rights by costly litigation. 
The tortuous litigation among members of the Kaneb family, which 
has twice within three years reached the Supreme Judicial Court,1 
demonstrates the dangers inherent in the nonobservance of corporate 
formalities. In the more recent case2 the key issue was whether the 
plaintiffs, sisters of Albert Kaneb, had derived any rights from him as 
stockholders in Central Oil Company. Central had originally been a 
partnership owned equally by Beton Kaneb and his sister Rachel. 
They and their two brothers, Albert, a lawyer, and Kenneth, decided 
to transfer the business to a newly organized corporation, and the 
articles of organization contained subscriptions for forty shares for 
Beton and twenty shares each for Rachel, Albert and Kenneth. 
Albert died within a week after the articles of organization were 
filed with the Secretary of State, and his property passed intestate to 
7329 Mass. 105, 106 N.E.2d 544 (1952). 
8329 Mass. at 113, 106 N.E.2d at 550. 
9 See the cases cited in note 4 supra. 
§5.3. 1 Samia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester, 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 679, 158 
N.E.2d 469; Kaneb v. Kaneb, 334 Mass. 525, 137 N.E.2d 215 (1956). 
2 Samia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester, 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 679, 158 N.E.2d 469. 
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his mother who died three years later. Nobill of sale transferring the 
assets of the partnership to the corporation was ever executed, and 
no stock certificates were issued until eleven years after the corporation 
was organized. The master before whom the case was tried found 
that upon the filing of the articles of organization the corporation 
immediately acquired the assets of the partnership.s In payment 
therefor the four subscribers became entitled to the agreed-upon 
amounts of stock, although Albert and Kenneth, who had no interest 
in the partnership, were deemed to have received gifts of their shares 
from Beton and Rachel. The plaintiffs as next of kin of their deceased 
mother thus acquired ownership of a part of Albert's shares, even 
though the inventory of neither estate listed any stock in Central. 
In upholding this finding the Supreme Judicial Court decided that 
"in this laxly handled family situation, where no rights of creditors or 
outsiders are involved," 4 standards of corporate procedure applicable 
to more widely owned business corporations need not be followed. 
This result, which clearly carried out the parties' express intentions, 
can hardly be quarreled with, yet it points out the dangers inherent 
in noncompliance with corporate formalities. Here the laxity stemmed 
originally from the untimely death of Albert, but the parties had ample 
opportunity thereafter to correct the situation. It is, of course, horn-
book law that the issuance of a stock certificate is not necessary to make 
a person a shareholder.5 Yet missing or improperly designated stock 
certificates, which almost every lawyer dealing with family corpora-
tions encounters from time to time, indicate that an excessive reliance 
is being placed upon this principle. 
§5.4. The pre-emptive right: Dilution of stockholder's interest for-
bidden on equitable principles. Although a stockholder in a Massa-
chusetts corporation has no statutory pre-emptive right to subscribe 
to newly issued shares,1 he is not without remedy if the new shares 
improperly dilute his interest. In the Samia case,2 discussed in the 
immediately preceding section, the Kaneb brothers had not only ap-
propriated Albert's stock interest for their own benefit, but they had 
also subsequently subscribed to additional stock at the price of $200 
per share. The Supreme Judicial Court, after awarding the plaintiffs 
their inherited portions of Albert's stock, conceded that they prob-
ably had no pre-emptive right to subscribe to additional shares. How-
ever, in order to avoid an unfair dilution of the plaintiffs' interests, 
the Court, in accordance with familiar equitable doctrine,S gave the 
3 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 684, 158 N.E.2d at 475. 
4 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 68!1, 158 N.E.2d at 474. 
Ii Atlantic Transportation Co. v. Alexander Shipping Co., 261 Mass. 1, 11, 157 
N.E. 725, 729 (1927); Ballantine, Corporations §199 (rev. ed. 1946) 
§5.4. 1 G.L., c. 156, §41. 
2 Samia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester, 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 679, 158 N.E.2d 469. 
B L. E. Fosgate Co. v. Boston Market Terminal Co., 275 Mass. 99, 175 N.E. S6 
(19!11); Ballantine, Corporations §209 (rev. ed. 1946). 
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sisters the right to subscribe for proportional amounts of additional 
stock at the price of $200 per share, the same basis upon which the 
brothers had purchased their shares. 
§5.5. Minority stockholders' suit: Direct relief to stockholders 
granted to avoid unjust enrichment. The Samia case,i a treasure 
trove of corporate law problems, produced another novel question for 
the Court to decide. Among other acts that the plaintiffs complained 
of was the organization by the defendants of a separate corporation, 
Union Oil Company, to operate a deep-water fuel oil terminal near 
Boston. Under familiar doctrine discussed above,2 the Court found 
that the incorporation of Union and the issuance of its shares to the 
defendants was an improper seizure of a corporate opportunity be-
longing to Central Oil Company, particularly when the bulk of the 
initial financing necessary for the operation of Union came from 
Central. The Court also found that Central had suffered damage in 
the amount of $75,000 as a result of the organization of Union. 
The plaintiffs, after alleging and establishing their status as share-
holders of Central, were minority stockholders seeking on behalf of 
Central relief against the conduct of the defendants in misappropri-
ating the Union Oil venture. Normal relief against this seizure would 
have been an order directing the defendants to transfer their Union 
stock to Central, since in the typical derivative stockholders' suit all 
recovery flows to the wronged corporation.s But, under the peculiar 
facts of the Samia case, such an order would have given one of the 
wrongdoing defendants practical control of both Central and Union. 
Faced with this problem the Court found precedents in other juris-
dictions,4 together with a dictum in an older Massachusetts case,5 that 
authorized more flexible relief. Instead of ordering a transfer of the 
Union stock held by the defendants to Central, the Court decreed that 
each of the plaintiffs should be permitted to purchase from the defend-
ants an equitable proportion of the Union shares by paying to them 
an aliquot part of the original subscription price of the Union stock.6 
This decree, on the surface at least, appears to accomplish more sub-
stantial justice than would have been afforded by the traditional 
method of awarding all relief directly to the corporation. In any 
event, the Court's willingness to break new ground in an effort to 
avoid a rigid result is certainly praiseworthy. 
§5.5. 1 Samia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester, 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 679, 158 
N.E.2d 469, discussed in §§5.3, 5.4 supra. 
2 See §5.2 supra. 
S Shaw v. Harding, 306 Mass. 441, 448, 28 N.E.2d 469, 473 (1940); Hayden v. Per· 
fection Cooler Co., 227 Mass. 589, 116 N.E. 871 (1917). 
4 May v. Midwest Refining Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 
668 (1941); Brown v. De Young, 167 Ill. 549, 47 N.E. 863 (1897); Joyce v. Congdon, 
114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29 (1921). 
5 Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 519, 74 N.E. 680, 681 
(1905). 
61959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 679, 699, 158 N.E.2d 469, 483. 
7
Loewenberg: Chapter 5: Corporations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1959
